Designing an effective deposit insurance structure: an international perspective by Douglas D. Evanoff
SPECIAL ISSUE THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK JULY 2001





by Douglas D. Evanoff
In December 2000, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago and the Financial Sta-
bility Forum cosponsored a symposium
on “Designing an Effective Deposit In-
surance Structure: An International
Perspective.” The symposium was in-
tended to generate informed feedback
on its  recommendations to countries
introducing or modifying deposit in-
surance schemes. Representatives of
the Financial Stability Forum discussed
their analyses and recommendations
with a select group of leading financial
and banking economists. The purpose
of this FedLetter is to summarize the dis-
cussion at the symposium and the re-
sulting conclusions.
The Financial Stability Forum and the
Working Group on Deposit Insurance
Following a number of recent disrup-
tions in international financial markets
(the Asian crisis, Russian devaluation,
and systemic concerns resulting from
Long-Term Capital Management) the
Group of 7 set up the Financial Stabili-
ty Forum (FSF) in 1998.  Comprised of
international regulatory and monetary
authorities, the FSF was directed to study
means to manage risk in the global fi-
nancial system. This was to be accom-
plished by developing standards and
codes of good practice, improving the
information exchange among financial
regulatory authorities, evaluating the
existing vulnerabilities within the inter-
national system, and developing priori-
ties and programs which best address
perceived weaknesses in these markets.
In an attempt to address industry fra-
gilities, the FSF has organized work-
ing groups to address specific areas of
concern. Past groups have evaluated
highly leveraged institutions, the vola-
tility of capital flows and excessive short-
term external indebtedness, offshore
financial centers, and international su-
pervisory/regulatory standards. The
most recently formed working group
of the FSF is concerned with deposit in-
surance issues. In 1999 a study group
was created to evaluate the contribu-
tion that deposit insurance can make
to financial stability. The study group
became a formal FSF working group in
April 2000 and includes experts from
several countries, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
The objective of the working group is
to provide guidance on the elements
of effective deposit insurance systems
for countries considering the adoption
of a limited-coverage deposit insur-
ance system or the reform of an exist-
ing system. The guidance will emphasize
practical assistance and will cover such
matters as public policy objectives and
the basic conditions that should exist
within a country wishing to put a system
in place.
Recently the group has begun a series
of outreach meetings in different re-
gions of the world with parties interest-
ed in deposit insurance issues. In
December 2000 one such meeting was
held at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago that included working group
members, industry experts selected to
critique the working group’s efforts to
date, and other interested parties main-
ly from the academic community. Mem-
bers of the working group discussed
four major areas: 1) the public policy
objectives for deposit insurance, 2) mor-
al hazard, 3) ensuring a country’s readi-
ness for deposit insurance, and 4) the
transition of a country from blanket
coverage to limited protection.
J. P. Sabourin, Canada Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation and Chairman of the
FSF Working Group on Deposit Insur-
ance, began the symposium by discuss-
ing the approach that the working
group had taken to achieve its mission.
He argued that the purpose of the group
was not to develop a set of standards or
best practices that countries would be
encouraged to use in initiating or ad-
justing their deposit insurance scheme.
Nor was the approach to be taken to en-
courage or discourage countries to in-
troduce deposit insurance. Indeed, most
of the group’s research suggested that a
“cookie-cutter” approach would not suit
all countries, but rather that the details
would depend on the characteristics of
the country. There was no single best
approach. This was an interesting intro-
duction to the symposium because much
of the critique that followed often ad-
dressed these very issues, with working
group members indicating that making
such recommendations would go be-
yond the mandate provided to them by
the FSF and discussants arguing that
the mandate should be expanded.
Insurance objectives and
infrastructure requirements
Greg Cowper, Canada Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, presented the work-
ing group’s analysis of public policy
objectives for deposit insurance.1 The
report was the result of a thorough re-
view of the academic literature and a
survey of numerous countries that had
introduced deposit insurance schemes.
The group was interested in finding
differences and similarities in objectives
across countries, in finding tradeoffs be-
tween various objectives, and in deter-
mining how these affected the structure
of deposit insurance schemes intro-
duced. Finally the group would analyze
the findings and make some limited
recommendations.
The findings of the literature review and
survey of individual countries were not
particularly surprising. The typical pub-
lic policy objectives of deposit insur-
ance were categorized into three groups:
to contribute to financial system stabili-
ty, protect less financially sophisticateddepositors, and enhance the ability of
regulators to achieve other related pol-
icy objectives. Other objectives included
the development of formal mechanisms
for resolving failed banks, contributing
to an orderly payments mechanism, and
avoiding or quickly resolving financial
crises. Alternative policy objectives in-
cluded increased competition resulting
from decreasing barriers in the depos-
it-taking industry, increased concentra-
tion of the cost of bank failure toward
the banking industry, enhanced eco-
nomic growth, the ability to help move
countries away from a 100% explicit de-
posit guarantee toward a regime with
limited coverage, and the ability to enact
additional bank legislation and regula-
tion. While system stability and protec-
tion of the less-sophisticated investor
are standard textbook objectives of
deposit insurance, the objectives of the
last general category were sometimes
less traditional.
Although there were similarities in the
survey responses, there did appear to
be differences in objectives across coun-
tries. Often these differences resulted
from country-specific circumstances con-
cerning the financial infrastructure; i.e.,
the set of legal, regulatory, and account-
ing institutions that support financial
markets and financial intermediation.2
The more developed the financial mar-
kets, the more common it was for the
private sector to have a greater role in
the administration of deposit insurance
and greater was the reliance on market
discipline. Based on their analysis, the
working group recommended that
countries should carefully delineate
the objectives of deposit insurance, tie
them to the abilities of the countries,
and ensure that the structure of the in-
surance scheme is consistent with the
stated objectives.
Jose Carlos Jaime, Seguro de Depositos
Sociedad Anonima, Argentina, pre-
sented the working group’s analysis
of how the deposit insurance scheme
should fit within other components of
the country’s safety net. As stressed ear-
lier by Sabourin, Jaime reiterated that
the group’s analysis started from the
premise that a country had decided to
establish an explicit deposit insurance
system. It was not the group’s objective
to argue the advantages and disadvan-
tages of doing so. Given that this deci-
sion had been made, how then should
the deposit insurance program operate
relative to the lender of last resort
function and the activities of the bank
supervisor?
Obviously the performance of any de-
posit insurance scheme will be affected
by the operation of the lender of last
resort and the effectiveness of supervi-
sion. While the presence of an insurance
system is not adequate to prevent the
spread of systemic risk, it can decrease
the spillover effects and their associat-
ed costs. But the insurance system must
work in harmony with other aspects of
the safety net. If the supervisor is slow
to respond to troubled banks, the cost
of intervention for the deposit insurance
fund is larger. While the lender of last
resort can resolve liquidity problems,
extending its use to insolvent institutions
can also result in additional costs for
the insurance fund. Thus, there are cer-
tain requirements of each element of
the safety net if the three elements are
to function most effectively.
The lender of last resort attempts to avoid
having the problems of individual insti-
tutions spill over to others. However, to
accomplish this without generating fu-
ture monetary problems, the central
bank must have an adequate stock of mar-
ket securities to sterilize any liquidity
injections. The more difficult it is for a
central bank to sterilize liquidity injec-
tions, the more negative the potential
effect of a liberal rediscounting policy.
Bank supervision is intended to avoid
errant behavior of individual banks. This
is accomplished by monitoring bank
behavior and imposing constraints. While
some constraints are imposed after a
bank has engaged in errant behavior,
the realization by banks that constraints
will be forthcoming often serves as a
source of discipline on bank actions
before it engages in the behavior.
Finally, how can deposit insurance best
interact with these other two safety net
functions? It was argued that it was im-
portant to realize what exactly was be-
ing protected by deposit insurance—
was it the banks, bankers, depositors?
While the trend has definitely moved
away from protecting the banker, and
was legislatively mandated in the U.S.,
there has been a movement to protect
banks for fear that the failure of indi-
vidual banks may result in systemic
problems. This has not enhanced the
effectiveness of deposit insurance. If
a supervisor realizes that failures will
always be covered, then there may be
a tendency to delay corrective action
resulting in unnecessarily high resolu-
tion costs.
The discussants for the first two pre-
sentations were Carl Tannenbaum,
ABN AMRO; Randall Kroszner, Univer-
sity of Chicago; Gordon Roberts, York
University; and Robert Bliss, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago.3 Tannenbaum
argued the potential benefits from
deposit insurance were significant.
By decreasing volatility and increasing
consumer confidence, the potential
for economic growth would improve.
He questioned, however, whether all of
the desired objectives could be achieved
without having 100% coverage. While
the smaller, less-sophisticated investor
could be protected by partial coverage,
the lack of perfect information in mar-
kets would occasionally lead to market
disruptions. While 100% coverage could
address these concerns, it would also
create moral hazard problems that would
offset some of the potential benefits.
Kroszner argued that while he agreed
with many of the general ideas in the
papers and presentations, he thought
the discussion was too general and ig-
nored many of the tradeoffs involved
with various elements of the safety net.
He stressed the need for effective cor-
porate governance mechanisms to en-
sure that bank management has the
correct incentives to prudently manage
risk. Failure to introduce such systems
can lead to inappropriate cross-subsidi-
zations and poor risk-management pro-
cedures. Unless sufficient precautions
are taken, one can end up doing more
harm than good by introducing a poor-
ly structured insurance scheme.
Roberts and Bliss stressed the problems
involved with introducing effective in-
surance schemes. Countries attempting
to limit an existing scheme may find it
more difficult to reconstruct the exist-
ing program than to introduce a new
scheme where one did not previously
exist. Thus optimal changes may differ
across countries. To the extent possible,
they recommended the incorporation
of market discipline when introducing
or modifying existing schemes through
mechanisms such as coinsurance and
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Issues in implementing deposit
insurance systems
 The second session of the symposium
emphasized the problems involved with
introducing deposit insurance arrange-
ments; particularly moral hazard issues
and the problems resulting from de-
creasing coverage in an attempt to rely
on alternative disciplining mechanisms.
George Hanc, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, discussed the moral haz-
ard problems that are inherent to any
deposit insurance program. He argued
that corporate governance, market dis-
cipline, and regulatory discipline need
to be incorporated simultaneously. To
do so, however, required an infrastruc-
ture that was sufficient to allow these
mechanisms to be effective. For exam-
ple, market discipline requires that mar-
ket participants have sufficient access
to meaningful information about the
bank. Thus, accounting standards and
regulatory rules and guidelines (and
perhaps mandatory disclosure) need
to be established and enforced. Hanc
stressed that a comprehensive regulatory
package included a strong and knowl-
edgeable supervisory group, prompt su-
pervisory responses, meaningful capital
requirements, and effective risk-man-
agement systems. He concluded moral
hazard was inherent to any deposit in-
surance scheme. With care, one could
limit its impact by utilizing some com-
bination of market and supervisory
discipline along with an effective cor-
porate governance scheme. The proper
mix between these three was probably
country specific.
Carlos Isoard, Board of Governors,
Instituto para la proteccion al Ahorro
Bancario, discussed the problems in-
volved with moving from blanket cover-
age (100%) to limited coverage, an
objective which was thought to be de-
sirable, but difficult to achieve. Isoard
reiterated the message of other work-
ing group members indicating that many
transition issues were country-specific
and did not lend themselves to general
guidelines. He argued that it was im-
portant for the parties implementing
the transition to have credibility and
to provide a clear set of deliverables
concerning the new program’s objec-
tives, coverage, funding source, and in-
stitutional arrangements. The actual
specifics could vary significantly across
countries depending on the situation
in each country and was dependent
on things such as the economic and
political framework, the existing regu-
latory and accounting environment,
and institutional arrangements. For
example, the decision as to whether
the new insurance system should be
managed by an umbrella supervisory
agent or an independent institution
with no other regulatory responsibili-
ties would vary according to the cur-
rent situation in each country. Similar
differences could exist with respect to
the decision to have ex ante or ex post
funding, the optimal size of the fund,
its investment policy, whether the fund-
ing was on or off budget, etc. Isoard
concluded by summarizing the ap-
proach taken by Mexico to transition
to a limited coverage environment. The
coverage reduction period began in
1999 and is scheduled to end in 2005.
The discussants for this session were
Robert Eisenbeis, Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta; George Kaufman,
Loyola University Chicago; and George
Pennacchi, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. Eisenbeis stated
that the working group had provided
a comprehensive laundry list of items
to be considered in implementing or
moving to a new deposit insurance
scheme, but there was little direction
provided as to how to put it all togeth-
er. He argued that by its very nature,
deposit insurance introduces tradeoffs.
Hard decisions have to be made. How
do you design a system to share the risk
among the bank, its depositors, and
the taxpayer? He thought that many
of the group’s stated objectives were
probably well beyond the scope of de-
posit insurance. For example, while
deposit insurance can protect the un-
sophisticated depositor (a relatively
minor problem in most countries) it
cannot prevent macroeconomic insta-
bility. That is most often caused by
poor macroeconomic policy. Funda-
mentally, what is it that deposit insur-
ance should be trying to accomplish?
Eisenbeis argued that the main objec-
tive should be to make bank failures
independent events. While insurance
programs may aid that process, other
policies such as prompt corrective ac-
tion probably play a more important
role. He argued that what was most
needed was the development of a
financial infrastructure to enable
private markets to discipline market
participants, to have swift supervisory
response when problems are encoun-
tered, and have established guidelines
as to how losses are to be distributed
when they occur.
Kaufman suggested that the working
group be bolder and strengthen their
recommendations instead of continually
emphasizing country-specific solutions.
While one size may not fit all, total flexi-
bility may not result in the adoption of
efficient programs. He also suggested that
the group better incorporate the find-
ings of the existing economic literature
into their recommendations. Pennacchi
argued that while the group had laid
out rather sensible guidelines, he thought
they could go further by analyzing how
the private sector would address issues
such as moral hazard and risk manage-
ment. When possible, market solutions
should be used to limit regulatory intru-
sion and encourage proper risk manage-
ment. He argued that this solution might
restrict the activities of banks. Financial
innovation has allowed banks to take on
additional risk using financial instru-
ments that are hard for supervisors to
monitor. Private markets would address
this problem by increasing reliance on
collateral and requiring that deposits be
backed with relatively transparent assets.
























































































































































































































There was general agreement by the dis-
cussants that deposit insurance reform
is a difficult issue and the working group
should be praised for their willingness
to take on the tough issues. They also
stressed the importance of the topic and
the need for a thorough understand-
ing of the tradeoffs involved with the
objectives. Typically one wants the forc-
es of the marketplace to influence firm
behavior, but regulators are most con-
cerned about discipline resulting in
bank deposit runs. While solvent banks
with access to a liquidity source need
not be concerned with these runs, reg-
ulators have shown they are concerned.
This suggests that one needs to stress
these standard tradeoffs and evaluate
evidence of the existence of such
tradeoffs. Obviously deposit insurance,
cannot solve all the problems—partic-
ularly those of conflicting objectives.
There were strong recommendations
by the discussants to better ground the
proposed guidelines within the exist-
ing research that has been done in this
area. What theoretical and empirical
evidence exists on the topics covered?
Are the guidelines consistent with that
work? Is the literature adequate? The
working group should initiate and/or
encourage others to conduct research
as needed in the relevant areas. That
work could parallel the current devel-
opment of guidelines.
It was also argued that if the recommen-
dations/guidelines are path-dependent,
then the authors should say as much.
The proposals are frequently not start-
ing with a clean slate and trying to im-
plement the most efficient insurance
scheme. Rather, it was argued, the au-
thors should explicitly recognize this
and say, for example, that they are start-
ing at, perhaps, step 4 of a 10-step pro-
cess. If the process had started at step
1, it may have evolved differently and
may have resulted in a more optimal
insurance program. Then, however, there
is a need to justify why step 4 was the
appropriate starting point. Once these
clarifications are made, the debate about
the details can take place on more com-
mon ground. This may resolve many of
the problems with different views con-
cerning appropriate directions the
working group should be taking.
There were also issues raised about
drawing conclusions about the behav-
ior of market participants if deposit in-
surance is introduced, based on behavior
in the current environment. Behavior
after a regulatory change may be very
different from that prior to the change.
The quality of the credit analysis, the
level of monitoring taking place, the
amount of disclosure, and the quality
of data provided to investors would all
change as market discipline is imposed
and regulatory reform is introduced.
Finally, there were suggestions that al-
though country specific characteristics
need to be taken into account in intro-
ducing a deposit insurance scheme,
efforts should be made to find common-
alties across countries. What common
characteristics need to be introduced?
What, if any, are the infrastructure re-
quirements? The important items dis-
cussed appear to be related to the use
of corporate governance, other aspects
of market discipline, means to protect
the deposit insurance fund, risk-based,
forward looking insurance premiums,
clear coverage limitations and advanced
decisions concerning closure policies.
These were some of the major issues
raised by the discussants. Accordingly
they should be some of the important
issues evaluated going forward.
1The papers discussed in this article and
related material can be found on the
Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation
web site at www.cdic.ca/international/
meetingdocs.cfm?Id=44&conf=conf.
2See also Michael H. Moskow, 2001, “Fi-
nancial infrastructure in emerging econ-
omies,” keynote address, Symposium on
Intermediation: Banking in Emerging
Markets, University of Michigan, Ann Ar-
bor, MI, June 15.
3Gordon Roberts was the scheduled dis-
cussant, but was unable to attend because
of inclement weather. Robert Bliss pre-
sented Roberts’ written comments and in-
cluded additional comments of his own.